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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Respondent, Joleen L. Scheller, concurs with the Statement
of Facts as presented by the Respondent, but submits the
following additional facts which are pertinent to this case.
That Joleen L. Scheller, mother of William "Billy Joe"
Scheller, cared for her son in her own home,and in the home of
her mother during the entire lifetime of the child.

That Michael

Pessetto, did not ever see the child or have any relationship
with him during the entire lifetime of the child.

(Michael

Pessetto's deposition of May, 19, 1987, Page 16 - 17).

There

were contacts between Joleen L. Sheller and Michael Pessetto at
the time of the paternity hearing on or about May

24, 1983, at

Ogden, Utah, but Michael Pessetto made no effort at that time to
ask where the mother and child were living, how the child was,
where he could find the child or how he could visit the child.
(See Transcript of Proceedings of October 16, 1987, pages 1 & 2,
Case No 16434; and Findings of Fact dtd. November 3, 1987,
paragraphs 4. & 5. )
The Trial Court found that Mr. Pessetto did not refuse to
support the child.

He paid what he had to pay and was forced to

pay by the court, and he did absolutely nothing beyond that.
(See Transcript of Proceedings of October 16, 1987,page 1, Case
No. 16434;
paragraph 3.).

and Findings of Fact dated November 3, 1987,
Michael Pessetto did not make an effort to visit

his son, did not send cards or gifts to a last known address, nor
did he inquire as to the well-being of his child at "some point".
(See Transcript of Proceedings of October 16, 1987, page 1, Case

1

No. 16434; and Findings of Fact dtd. November 3, 1987, Paragraphs
4. , 5., & 6. )
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Section 75-2-109(1) (b) (ii) of Utah Code Annotated recognizes
the reality that mothers and fathers of children born out of
wedlock are not similarly situated.
a

legitimate

manner

between

The statute discriminates in

a father

who openly

treats an

illegitimate child as his and a father who does not openly treat
an illegitimate

child

as his. The statute

does not

violate

Article IV, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution or the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The statute creates a classification based upon gender,
which classification serves and is substantially related to the
important governmental objective of providing for a fair and
efficient manner of inheritance from a child born out of wedlock,
by ensuring that such inheritance is received by a parent who has
actually had some participation in the nurturing of the deceased
child during its lifetime. The statute passes the constitutional
muster

of the intermediate level of scrutiny applied by the

courts.
The statute is not violative of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution under the Equal Protection Clause
or the Due Process Clause in that it permits different treatment
of an unmarried mother and an unmarried father, recognizing that
they are not similarly

situated.

It reasonably

requires the

father to evidence some degree of interest and commitment to the

2

child in order for him to acquire a right of the stature eligible
for constitutional protection.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 75-2-109(1) (b) (ii) DOES NOT
VIOLATE ARTICLE IV, OF SECTION 1 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION BY
PROVIDING A DIFFERENT CRITERIA FOR MOTHERS THAN FOR FATHERS TO
INHERIT THROUGH THEIR DECEASED CHILD.
It is well settled that the Equal Protection Clause of
Article IV, of Section 1, of the Utah Constitution protects
against discrimination when legislation provides dissimilar
treatment for individuals who are similarly situated.
Lewis, 693 P.2d 62 (Utah 1984).

Malan B.

The Utah Supreme Court and the

United States Supreme Court have both held that certain
classifications based upon sex are invalid under equal protection
analysis.

R£ ed v^ R ee cl 404 U.S. 71 (1971); £jr orijt _i _§£ o v^_

Richardson 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Pusey y^_ Pusey 728 P.2d 117 (Utah
1986).

"Underlying these decisions is the principal that a state

is not free to make overbroad generalizations based on sex which
are entirely unrelated to any differences between men and women
or which demean the ability or social status of the affected
class."

Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 354 (1979).

It is only

under those situations wherein a statute provides dissimilar
treatment as between men and women who are similarly situated
that the equal protection clauses of both the Utah State
Constitution and the United Sates Constitution are violated.
A. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 75-2-109
DISCRIMINATORY BY GENDER ON ITS FACE.

(l)(b)(ii) IS NOT

The United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court
have noted that in situations in which men and women are not

3

similarly

situated,

and

a

statutory

classification

is

realistically based upon the differences in their situations, the
statutory classification creates no gender-based discrimination.
See e.g., Parham v. Hughes, Supra; Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S.
2 48 (1983); Schlesinger y^ Ballard 419 U.S. 498 (1975); see also
Ellis v. Social Service Department of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter Day Saints, 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980); Redwood Gym y^
Salt Lake County Commission, 624 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1981).
B. THE SUBJECT STATUTE'S GENDER DISTINCTIONS ARE
RATIONAL AND REALISTIC, AND NOT IN VIOLATION OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION.
Appellant erroneously argues that once the father has been
adjudicated to be a parent of the child, that commencing at that
moment the mother and the father are similarly situated, and that
without

any further requirement on the part of the father, he

should inherit equally with the mother of the child.

The father

Michael Pessetto, reaches this conclusion in a conclusory manner
without citation of any direct authority to support such view.
The

cited

Utah

Statute

does

not

create

a

gender

based

classifaction at all, but it merely discriminates in a legitimate
manner between a father who openly treats an illegitimate child
as his and a father who does not openly treat an illegitimate
child as his.
The mere adjudication under a State initiated paternity
proceeding, as in the instant case, that the father is the parent
of the child

born

to the mother does not make the father

similarly situated with the mother from the time of adjudication
forward.

We need not be medical doctors to discern that young women
and young men are not similarly situated with respect to the
problems and risk each incurs from sexual intercourse outside of
the marital relationship.

Only women may become pregnant, and

they suffer disproportionately the profound physical, emotional
and psychological consequences of such sexual acitivity.

The

mother, by virtue of her pregnancy is automatically responsible
for the child; she has the burdens and responsibilities of the
pregnancy.

She may choose to abort the child, or she may carry

it full term.

She is subject to any social stigmas against her

during the pregnancy
state.

term by reason of her visible physical

In short, the mother of a child has from conception a

nurturing relationship and commitment to the child, which events
after birth cannot alter.
child

and

giving

relationship

with

The role of the mother in carrying the

birth

thus

alone

establish

the child

which

validly

a

bond

supports

of
the

legislative distinctions expressed in the subject statute.
On the other hand the biological father is not automatically
responsible

for

the child.

legitimating the child.

He may not have an interest in

In most cases, he can wait until after

the child is born before committing himself, even to the point of
awaiting State action against him before making any committment.
During this time while the unmarried pregnant female is trying to
determine what

she will do with the child, and how she will care

for and properly support the child, if she elects to keep it, the
father is totally free from any responsibility with respect to

5

the child or the mother.

To classify him as a parent entitled to

receive an inheritance from his deceased child, as in the case
now before the court, absent any relationship with the child from
date of birth to date of death, would constitute a windfall that
makes no social or legal sense.

The constitution protects only

parent-child relationships of

a father who has actually made

some open commitments

towards an association with the child.

The cited provisions of the Utah Uniform Probate Code that:
"....the paternity established under this sub-section,
(l)(b)(n), is ineffective to qualify the father or his
kindred to inherit from or through the child unless the
father has openly treatd the child as his and has not
refused to support the child." (Utah Code Annotated Sec.
75-2-109 (l)(b)(n).)
in no manner

violates

the constitutional

rights

of

a male

adjudicated to be the parent of the child in respect to his right
of inheritance

from the child.

The hypothetical case situation presented by the Appellant
and quoted as follows:
"The result being that if both the mother and the
father were to abandon a child immediately after birth,
the mother could recover automatically, yet the father
could not. The only basis for making this distinction is
that of gender" (Appellant's Brief, page 9)
is based upon the false assumption that once the father has been
adjudicated a parent that both the mother and father have at once
become similarly situated, which premise is clearly erroneous.
In M ichael M. vs. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 4 50 US
464,(1981),

The

United

States

Supreme

Court,

upheld

the

constitutionality of a California statutory rape law under which
men

alone

were held criminally liable

6

for

the

act of

sexual

intercourse, as nonviolative of the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendendment, and declared at pages 468 and 469 of the
opinion as follows:
"But because the Equal Protection Clause does not
'demand that a statute necessarily apply equally to all
persons' or require 'things which are different in
fact... to be treated in law as though they were the
same.' Rinaldi vs. Yeager 384 US 305,309, 16 L Ed 2d
577, 86 S Ct 1497 (1966), quoting Tiqner v Texas, 310
US 141, 147, 84 L Ed 1124, 60 S Ct 879, 130 ALR 1321
(1940), this Court has consistently upheld statutes
where the gender classification is not invidious, but
rather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes
are not similarly situated in certain circumstances.
Parham _v Hughes, supra; Califano v Webster, 430 US 313,
51 L Ed 2d 360, 97 S Ct 1192 (1977);
Schlesinger v
Ballard, 419 US 498, 42 L Ed 2d 610, 95 S Ct 572, 9 3NA
FEP Cas 33 (1975); Kahn v Shevin, 416 US 351,40 L Ed
2d 189, 94 S Ct 1734 (1974). As the Court has stated, a
legislature may 'provide for the special problems of
women.' Weinberger v Wiesenfeld, 420 US 636, 653, 43 L
Ed 2d 514, 95 S Ct 1225 (1975)."
The case which most closely coincides with the instant case
is the United States Supreme Court Case of Parham v. Hughes,
Supra,

which

involved

a Georgia

statutory

provision

which

determined which parties were entitled to bring a wrongful action
upon the death of an illegitimate child.
a mother
entitled

of a legitimate
to bring

qualification,

Under the Georgia code,

or illegitimate

a wrongful

death

action

child

was

without

always
further

but the father of a child could only bring a

wrongful death action if the child was legitimate and if the
mother had died.

The effect of the statute was to require the

father of an illegitimate child to officially legitimatize the
child prior to the death of the child before he could bring a
wrongful death action.

7

In Parhamf
automobile

the biological father of the boy, who died in an

accident

with

his mother,

attempted

to bring a

wrongful death action to recover for the boy's death.

The father

had signed the child's birth certificate, contributed to his
support, given the child his last name, and visited the child on
a regular basis, but he had never taken the additional step of
officially legitimatizing the child.

Because of this latter

factor, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Georgia
Supreme Court ruling which held that the father was not a proper
party to bring a wrongful death action.

The court rejected the

father's claim that the statutory provision created a genderbased classification, holding squarely that:
"(t)he fact is that mothers and fathers of illegitimate
children are not similarly situated." (441 U.S. at 355.)
Noting that the father had the ability to take action to
establish his rights as a father, the court concluded:
"Thus, the conferral of the right of a natural
father to sue for the wrongful death of his child only
if he has previously acted to identify himself,
undertake his paternal responsibilities, and make his
child legitimate, does not. JL§j[,1 e?c:t. a.riy; ^yejrb^oad
generalizations about men ajs a, class, but rather the
reality that in Georgia only a father can by unilateral
action legitimate an illegitimate child. Since fathers
who do legitimate their children can sue for wrongful
death in precisely the same circumstances as married
fathers whose children were legitimate ab initio, the
statutory classification does not discriminate against
fathers as a class but instead distinguishes between
fathers who have legitimated their children and those
who have not. Such a classification is quite unlike
those condemned in the Reed, Frontiero, and Stanton
cases which were premised upon overbroad generalizations
and excluded all members of one sex even though they
were similarly situated with members of the other sex."
Id. at 356-57 (emphasis added; footnote omitted)."

a

The application of Parham to the present case is clear.

As

in Parham, Michael Pessetto was not precluded from inheriting
from his deceased son merely by virtue of his status of being
a father rather than a mother of an illegitimate child. Instead,
he had the ability to place himself in a position of heirship
simply by taking one of the two means under Utah Code Annotated
Sec. 75-2-109 to establish his rights of inheritance as a father.
These requirements placed on a father of an illegitimate child
reflect

the biological

illegitimate
concomitant

reality

that

mothers and

children are not similarly

fathers of

situated and

the

fact that the legislature has valid reasons for

imposing more stringent requirements of proof of paternity and
commitment to a child on the father of an illegitimate child than
on the mother.
Even a casual reading of the cases of Lehr v. Robertson, 463
US 24 8 (198 3) and Ellis v. Social Services Department of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah
1980) as cited by Appellant makes it apparent

that neither of

these cases support the Appellant's claim,
"
that a statute can discriminate on the basis of
paternity, but once paternity is established, the mother
and father stand on equal ground and no discrimination
is allowable" (Quoted from Page 10 of Appellant's Brief)
In fact there are no

cases that support Appellant's proposition

that once paternity is established the father and mother stand on
equal ground, without regard to the other factual circumstances
of the respective parents in relationship to the child.
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The s u b j e c t
Pessetto

in

violation

Constitution

of

by d e n y i n g

deceased son,
State

s t a t u t e does not d i s c r i m i n a t e a g a i n s t
Article

IV

Section

him a w i n d f a l l

under a d e t e r m i n a t i o n

Michael

1 of

the

Utah

inheritance

from

his

of p a t e r n i t y

initiated

by

action,

C. NO OTHER STATES WITH PROVISIONS IN THEIR STATE
CONSTITUTIONS SIMILAR TO ARTICLE IV, SECTION I OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION HAVE INVALIDATED SIMILAR GENDER-BASED LEGISLATION.
T h i s i s a c a s e of f i r s t
specificallly

addressed the p a r t i c u l a r

Code A n n o t a t e d
Uniform
at

Sec.

ten

Rev.

109(c)(2);
Comp.

Stat.

S^£/_

in q u e s t i o n .

a provision

15-ll-109(b) (II);

Utah
of

the

i n t h e same form

Al^as^a

Anru

has

Sec.

Sec.

1 4 - 2 109 ( 2 ) ( b ) ;
Code S e c .

15-2-

18A, Sec 2 - 1 0 9 (2) ( i i i ) ;

Mich.

Stat.

Sec.

2 3 0 9 ( 2 ) ( i i ) ; N.M. S t a t . Ann, s e c . 4 5 - 2 - 1 0 9 ( B ) ( 3 ) .

This

statutory

these

has never

states.

7 0 0. I l l (4) ( c ) ;

Idaho

S.t.a.jLi-

in

Rev.

provision

Sec

is

e.g.,

Sjta^

me Rev. S t a t . Ann, t i t .

M w s . Ann.

statute

(l)(b)(ii)

A_r_iz^ R e y ^
Sec.

and no o t h e r s t a t e

has been e n a c t e d

states.

1 3 . 1 1 . 0 4 5 ( 2 ) (B) ;
Colo.

75-2-109

P r o b a t e Code which

least

impression,

been

See e.g.

declared

Neb.

unconstitutional

30-

i n any

M a t t e r of E s t a t e o:f S p e n c e r ,

of

14 7 M i c h .

App. 6 2 6 , 383 N.W.2d 266 ( 1 9 8 5 ) a p p l y i n g M i c h i g a n e q u i v a l e n t

of

Utah 7 5 - 2 - 1 0 9 .
All

of

Appellants

the
brief

the p a r t i c u l a r
that

other

gender
are

discrimination

easily

cases

distinguishable

as

on t h e i r

s i t u a t i o n a t i s s u e in t h i s c a s e .
states

unconstitutional.

have

In e a c h

held
instance

10

cited

similar
where o t h e r

It

by

the

facts

from

i s not

true

statutes
states

to
have

be
held

statutes to be unconstitutional as being gender-based, the
fathers have established emotional bonds with their children
which have made them similarly situated with the mother- It is
the emotional bond with the child and not his biological
connection alone that gives the father an interest of the same
constitutional stature as the mother. Matter of Adoption of Baby
Boy Dy 742 P2d 1059, Okla. (1985), at 1065.
POINT II.
SECTION 75-2-109 (1)(b) ( i i) DOES NOT VIOLATE THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION BY ANY GENDER-BASED DISCRIMINATION.
A. RESPONDENT CONCURS THAT GENDER-BASED CLASSIFICATIONS OF
STATE STATUTES BY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT MUST PASS AN
INTERMEDIATE LEVEL OF SCRUTINY.
Appellant has correctly expressed

the intermediate level

of scrutiny rationale as adopted by the Courts that gender-based
distinctions in state statutes "must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement
of those objectives." Caban vs. Mohammed,

441 US 380, 388

(1979); Craig vs. Boren 429 US 190,197 (1976).
3. SECTION 75-2-109(1)(b) (ii) EASILY PASSES CONSTITUTIONAL
MUSTER UNDER THE INTERMEDIATE LEVEL OF SCRUTINY.
In

the

instant

case,

the cited

statute

clearly

is

substantially related to the important government interest in the
maintenance of an accurate, fair, and efficient system for the
disposition of property at death, and to the objectives of
ensuring that an inheritance from an illegitimate child goes to a
parent who has participated actively in the nurturing of the
child, and of preventing a parent who has taken no active role in

the birth or rearing of the child from reaping a financial
windfall.
The United States Supreme Court has frequently recognized
that a state has an important and considerable interest in the
maintenance

of a fair

and

efficient

method

of

intestate

succession. See Lalli vs. Lalli, 439 US 259, 268 (1978); Trimble
vs. Gordon, 430 US 762,771, (1977); L a b m e vs. Vincent 401 US
532, 538 (1971). This Court interest is directly implicated in
the issue of paternal inheritance from an illegitimate child
because of the issues of proof, and the equities associated with
a father's

role

in the child's life. Lall I vs. Laili supra.

Moreover the Supreme Court has also recognized that a state has
an important interest in distinguishing between natural fathers
who participate

in the raising of illegitimate

children and

fathers who make not effort to have a part in a child's life
beyond what is required of them by court decree. See Caban vs.
Mohammed, supra 441 US at 3 92: Lehr vs. Robertson, supra, 46 3 US
at

266-67.

In

the

instant

case,

at

the

conclusion

of

the

evidentiary hearing, the Trial Court, recited in its declaration
of findings of fact as follows:
"I have already found that Mr. Pessetto did not
refuse to support the child, I can only find, however,
that he paid what he had to pay and was forced to pay by
the Court. And he did absolutely nothing beyond that.
A person, in my interpretation, who openly treats
the child as his would try to find that child, would
make an effort to pay support, would make an effort to
visit the child, and would at least send cards or gifts

to a last known address.
Would inquire as to the
condition and well being of the child at some point. And
I find that Mr. Pessetto made no meaningful attempt to
do any of those things." (Trial Transcript of Proceedings
of October 16, 1987, pages 1 and 2.
Although the United States Supreme Court has never directly
considered the issues presented in this case, it is clear from
analogous cases that the Court would uphold the classification
created

by

the

subject

statute

as

being

one

which

is

substantially related to the important governmental interests in
rights

of

inheritance.

In

Caban

vs. Mohanned,

supra, for

example, the court struck down the application of a New York law
which always permitted the adoption of an illegitimate child
without the approval of the natural father, but it is clear from
the court's opinion that the decision rested on the need to give
an acitve, loving natural father a voice in whether to permit an
adoption.

The

facts

in

CLabari, showed

the

father

of

the

illegitimate children had been identified as the father on the
children's birth certificates, had lived

with them for four

years, and continued to support and visit with the children until
the mother decided to marry another man and have him adopt the
children.
fathers

Because the statute made no

with

a "substantial

distinction

between

relationship" with a child

and

unmarried mothers who were similarly situated, the court held
that it was unconstitutionally applied in the case before it.
However, the court specifically added that the state could treat
unmarried fathers and mothers differetly when they did in fact
treat their children differently,

"In those cases where the father has never come
forward to participate in the rearing of his child,
nothing in the Equal Protection Clause precludes the
state from withholding from him the privilege of vetoing
the adoption of that chLld."(441 US at 392)
1n

k£JlJL V-Oi. E9.k*LLjLiLorix s>jiJDr,a., the Court

applied

this

reasoning in the adoption context and squarely held that the
quality of the relationship between a father and his illegitimate
child could determine the extent of the father's right to receive
notice of a pending adoption.

The state law at issue permitted

natural fathers to have a role in adoption decisions, but only if
they filed a claim of paternity with the state's "putative father
registry."

The father in Lehr had not done so, but argued that

he had substantially complied with the statute by acknowledging
his paternity, attempting to support the child, and trying to
visit her.
valid

The Court disagreed, holding that the state had a

interest

in creating specific means by which putative

fathers could safeguard their parental

rights, and that the

distinctions drawn between such fathers and unrnnarried
were not unconstitutional.

mothers

The Court concluded that

"the existence or nonexistence of a substantial
relationship between parent and child is a relevant
criterion in evalutatmg. ...the rights of the parent..."
(464 US at 266-67).
With regard to how such a substantial relationship is shown the
Court further stated:
"The mother carries and bears the chLld, and in
this sense her parental relationship is clear.
The
validity of the father's parental claims must be gauged
by other measures."
Id. at 260 n. 16 (quoting Caban vs. Mohammed, supra, 441
US at 397, J. Stewart, dissenting).
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The Utah Supreme Court has applied the same reasoning in
upholding a statute requiring an unmarried father to file a claim
of paternity within a certain period of time or lose the right to
prevent the adopton of his child.

In Ellis vs. Social Services

Department of. tjie Church og Jesus Christ of Latter-Day SaintS/
supra/ the court rejected the father's claim based on Caban vs.
Mohammed f supra that the statute provided unequal treatment of
the unwed

mother and father.

Citing

the language

in Caban

concerning the legitimate distinction between a caring father and
one who never came forward to participate in the rearing of his
child, the court
distinguishable

concluded

that the holding

in £a.b«ani was

merely by virtue of the fact that the Utah

statute gave an unmarried father the opportunity to protect his
rights, whereas the one in Caban did not.
Similarly, in W.E.J, vs. Superior Court of Los Angeles/ 100
Cal App. 3d 303/ 160 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1980)/ the court upheld a
Calfornia law which witheld from a biological father the power to
veto an adoption unless he had married the mother or "receives
the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his
natural child."

Distinguishing Caban vs. Mohammed/ supra/ the

court stated:
"The California statute.... avoids the fault of
discriminating between all unwed mothers and all unwed
fathers.
The satutory classification sets apart those
biological fathers who have neither gone through an
apparently valid marriage ceremony with the mother nor
live with the child as a parent.
Those biological fathers who are denied the veto
power are easily distinguished from those who hold that
power. Members of this class have neither expressed the

interest which is implied in the marriage ceremony nor
undertaken the care of the child in a common home.*
To the extent that this classification is based
upon gender, it is based upon an actual difference in
situation.
Whatever else may be said of an unwed
mother, she is not a stranger to her child. A genderbased claissification is not improper when men and women
are not similarly situated. (See Schlesinqer v. Ballard
419 US 498, 95 S. Ct. 572, 42 L.Ed. 2d 610.)"
160 Cal. Rptr. at 869; accord In Interest of T.E.T., 603 S.W.2d
793 (Tex. 1980)f cert, denied, 450 US 1025 (1981); Collins vs.
Division of Foster Care, 377 So. 2d 1266 (la. Ct. App. 1979);
Matter of Adoption of Baby Boy D, 742 P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1985).
Thus, the case law clearly establishes that a state may
validly discriminate between an unmarried father and an unmarried
mother when the discrimination
alone, but rather

is based not simply on status

is linked to the degree of interest and

commitment expressed by the father.

The subject statute in the

instant case permits different treatment only when the father and
mother are not actually

in similar positions, and it is

substantially related to an important governmental objective of
providing for an orderly manner of inheritance from illegitimate
children.

Utah Code Annotated, 75-2-109(1)(b) ( i i ) in the case

before the Court is not violative of equal protection.
POINT III. SECTION 7 5-2- 109 (1) (b ) ( i i ) DOES NOT VIOLATE THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION BY ALLOWING A MOTHER, BUT NOT A FATHER, TO INHERIT
THROUGH THEIR CHILD, UNLESS THE FATHER HAS OPENLY TREATED THE
CHILD AS HIS.
As has been previously stated in the preceding portions of
this brief, an unmarried father and an unmarried mother cannot
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validly be characterized

as being "similarly situated" for

purposes of analyzing the application of the Equal Protection
Clause.

For the same reasons supporting this conclusion, it is

also apparent that an unmarried father suffers no due process
violation by virtue of a state statute which requires him to
openly treat the child as his before he may inherit from the
child,

Mr. Pessetto has failed to identify how the due process
clause protects the right alleged in this case in any manner
beyond that as alleged in his equal protection arguments.

The

cases cited by the Appellant in his due process claim all involve
actions against the federal government, to which the Fourteenth
Amendment does not apply, and thus the argument rests upon the
equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment in lieu of the
equal protection

clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment.

See

Caiiiano vs^ Goldfarb, 430 US 199 (1977); Weinberger vs^_
Wissenfeld, 420 US 636 (1975); Califlano vs. Webster, 440 US 313
(19 77); Califano vs^ Wescott, 443 US 76 (1979).
Hughes,supra, 441 US at 1749, to

See Parham vs.

the effect that the Due

Process Clause is not implicated by statute setting forth which
persons could bring wrongful death action on behalf of an
illegitimate child.
However, even assuming that the Appellant could point to
some recognized property or liberty interest, it is manifestly
clear that such an interest is adequately protected by the
subject statute 75-2-109.

The numerous cases previously cited in
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this brief indicate that an unmarried father may be treated
differently from an unmarried mother so long as he is not
completely

precluded

unmarried mother.

from enjoying

rights shared

with the

In Lehr vs. Robertson, supra, which in part

involved an alleged deprivation of a liberty interest of a
natural father in the adoption context, the court: specifically
stressed that the liberty interest in the family relationship
rises to a protected level only when the father "demonstrates a
full

commitment

to

the

responsibilities

of parenthood

by

'com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his child1".
463 US at 261 (quoting Caban vs. Mohammed, supra, 441 US at 392).
The Court further found that "the mere existence of a biological
link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection" under
the due process clause. Id.
Because of Mr. Pessetto's inattention and lack of caring
towards his son prevented him from creating a protectible liberty
interest and prevented his qualification as an heir of the
decedent, he cannot now claim that any due process violation has
occurred.
POINT IV. SECTION 75-2-109(1) (b) (l l) OF THE SUBJECT UTAH STATUTE
IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE, AND IT DOES MEET THE
REQUIREMENTS OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUION.
The language of Sub-paragraph ( n ) of the subject statute
requiring a father to have "openly treated the child as his own"
in addition to "not refuse to support the child" is not vague
language. The Trial Judge

stated
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from the bench

as follows in

his decision at the conclusion of the October 16, 1987, trial:
"The remaining issue of fact is whether he openly
treated the child as his child. Apparently there is no
help in the case law as to what that phrase means, so we
look to just the common English language and terms that
are used there. It appears to me that in some way he
must have tried to act like a parent to that child at
some point.
A person, in my interpretation, who openly treats the
child was his would try to find that child, would make an
effort to pay support, would make an effort to visit the
child, would at least send cards or gifts to a last known
address. Would inquire as to the condition and well
being of the child at some point." (Trial Transcript
of Proceeding of October 16, 1987, pages 1 and 2.)
The Trial judge had no difficulty in immediately determining
the meaning of "openly treat as his own" by the common usage
approach of such term in the English language. The

designation

of a phrase that is simple and understandable in every day
as "vague" does not make it vague.

usage

The term "openly treat as his

own" and variations thereof are in common usage among most of us
in

our

daily

conversations

about

family

life

and

the

relationships exhibited between parent and child.
Most of us could agree by reason of our common sense and
life experiences
elements

of

necessity

of

as a child

being

"openly

a definition.

and parent
treat

as to the objective

as his own"

English

speaking

without

people

the

in our

American culture have a common understanding of such expressions,
and our understanding would
standards as stated by

the

include the same basic objective
Trial Judge in his quoted opinion.

Men of common intelligence would not have to guess as to the
meaning of

"openly

treat

as

his

own"

in

reference

to

a

parent child relationship. Without difficulty, such a phrase is
commonly understood by all English speaking people in the culture
of our state so as not to cause deprivation of rights or property.
POINT V. IT IS A MAXIM OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, THAT A COURT
MUST PRESUME A STATUTE TO BE CONSTITUTIONAL AND AVOID
CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES WHENEVER POSSIBLE.
It is a well-established maxim of statutory construction
that a court must presume a statute to be constitutional, and
must construe a statute to avoid constitutional infirmities
whenever possible. State vs. Lmdquist, 674 P.2d 1234 (Utah
1983).

Accordingly, it is the duty of a court to effectuate the

intent of the legislature whenever possible, State vs. Casarez,
656. P.2d 1005 (Utah 1982), and it must investigate and discover
any reasonable avenues by which the statute can be upheld. Trade
Commission vs. Skaggs Drug Center, Inc.,21 Utah 2d 431, 446 P.2d
958 (Utah 1968).

It is not within the province of the court to

take into consideration every conceivable hypothetical situation
in determining the constitutionality of statutes.

As the courts

have often demonstrated in gender discrimination cases

involving

unmarried fathers and mothers, the possibility that the statute
might in some hypothetical case unconstitutionally favor an
unmarried mother who may neglect or abandon her child is no basis
for striking down the statute.

In this case, it is beyond

question that the mother did openly treat the deceased as her
child from birth until death, while the Appellant did not. See
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Parham vs. Hughes, supra; Lehr vs. Robertson, sjj£Jraj_ Ellis Vs.
Social Services Department of, the Church oJf Jesus Christ of.
Latter

Day

Saints,

supra;

W.E.J, vs. Superior

Court of Los

Angeles, iLU£JLaj_ iH iB.t:£..r£.>st: of_ T. E.T., §.u&L<LL ££iiJLILS vs.
Division of Foster Care, supra; Matter of Adoption of Baby Boy D,
supra (all upholding statutes which assumed

non-abandonment by

the mother).
The Appellant bears the heavy burden of proving that the
subject statute is unconstitutional. Ellis vs. Social Services
Department of Chruch of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, Supra.
Any doubts must be resolved m

favor of the constitutionality of

the statute, and the statute cannot be declared unconstitutional
unless it is found to be so beyond a reasonable doubt. Stone vs.
Department of Registration, 567 P.2d 1115 (Utah 1977)
CONCLUSION
Respondent

respectfully

requests

that

the Judgment

and

Decree of Judge David E. Roth of the Trial Court, dated March 8,
1988, be affirmed, declaring that 75-2-109, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as Amended is a constitutional statute of the State of
Utah, and that Joleen L. Scheller, as mother of William "Billy
Joe" Scheller, deceased, is the sole heir at law

to inherit from

said child; and that Michael Pessetto, father of said child

shall

not inherit.

Attorney
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Examination (By Mr. Kunz)
1
2

A.
I

I don't remember.
MR. SKEEN:

Let me just interject.

Rather than

3

objecting to every question, I'm going to make a continuing

4

objection to relevance at this point.

5

MR. KUNZ:

6

MR. SKEEN:

7

MR. KUNZ:

8
9

Off the record just a second.
Maybe we could resolve it.
Off the record for a second.

(There was a discussion held off the record.)
Q.

BY MR. KUNZ:

When was your first —

do you have any

10

recollection of any conversation with her between the time

11

that you found out she was pregnant and the child was born?

12

A.

I don't remember.

13

Q.

Okay.

Do you have any recollection of any

14

conversations with her father or mother between the time that

15

you knew she was pregnant and the child was born?

16

A.

I don't remember.

17

Q.

Okay.

18

Do you know that the child was born on

August 10th, 1981; do you know that?

19

A.

20

f Q.

21

Scheller?

22

A.

I never knew where he was at.

23

Q.

You're not answering my question.

24
25

Yes.
Did you at any time during his lifetime see Billy Joe

Did you at any

time during his lifetime see Billy Joe Scheller?
A.

How could I when I didn't know where he was at?

17
Examination (By Mr. Kunz)
1

I

MR. SKEEN:

2

I

MR. KUNZ:

3

You need to instruct him.

That's a

straightforward question.

4

MR. SKEEN:

5

I've instructed him, Counsel.

I

instructed him.

6

It takes a yes or no.

7

|A.

8

Answer yes or no.

NO.

MR. SKEEN:

9

If he wants to know beyond that he'll ask

you.

10

J

11

|

12

It just calls for a yes or no.

/ Q.

THE WITNESS:

Okay.

BY MR. KUNZ:

Did you at any time after this child

was born ever request to see or visit the child?

13

JA.

14

Q.

NO.

Did you at any time after the payment of the $1250

15

that was paid to the state pay any $100 per month payments

16

through the Clerk of the Court for the support of the child?

17

A.

I called and asked why I wasn't making support

18

payments anymore and they looked and said nobody's requesting

19

anything, we cannot give you any information.

20
21

Q.

Did you receive a copy of the order that was mailed

to you setting forth your child support payments?

22

A.

No, not to my recollect.

23

Q.

I'll show you what we'll mark as Petitioner's

24

Exhibit 1 which purports to be an order from the Second

25

Judicial District Court of Weber County dated September 19th,
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under my direction and supervision;
THAT the foregoing pages contain a true and correct
transcription of my said shorthand notes so taken.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have subscribed my name and
affixed my seal this c<^£^day

of

Notary Public
State of Utah
My commission expires
December 5, 1989.
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE

:

OF

:

WILLIAM "BILLY J O E " SCHELLER,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE
PETITION FOR FORMAL
DETERMINATION OF HEIRS

:
Probate

Deceased.

Joleen

L. S c h e l l e r ,

entiteld

Court

William

"Billy

December,
to hearing
counsel,

1 9 8 6 , by a n d t h r o u g h

James

Petition,

E. M o r t o n ,

his Objection

of

dated

Annotated,

for

Joe" Scheller,

the Court
Heirs,

as P e t i t i o n e r ,

her Petition

of s a i d

of

decedent

t h e S t a t e of Utah.

under

on

Morton

the

Paul

Pessetto,

the

above-

Heirs

of

day

of

2nd

T. Kunz.

Prior

by a n d t h r o u g h

& Skeen,

for Formal

10, 1987, c l a i m i n g
Section

with

D e t e r m i n a t i o n of

her attorney,

of H a t c h ,

1 9 5 3 , a s Amended,

above-named

filed

deceased,

Michael

P e s s e t t o s h o u l d be d e t e r m i n e d
the

Formal

to the Petition

February

No, 16434

:

that

filed

his
with

Determination

under

7 5 - 2 - 1 0 9 ( 1 ) (b) ( i i ) ,

Utah

Code

Michael

t o be a l e g a l h e i r of t h e e s t a t e of
the

The o b j e c t i n g

laws

of

party

intestate

succession

thereafter

requested

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
WILLIAM "BILLY JOE"SCHELLER
Page 2 - Probate No. 16434
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

that

the

matter

be

placed

on

the

trial

calendar

for

determination.
The above entitled matter came on regularly tor trial at
9:30 a.m., October 16, 1987, pursuant to notice to the parties,
before the Honorable David E. Roth, Judge of the above-entitled
Court, sitting without jury.

Petitioner, Joleen L. Scheller,

appeared in person and was represented by her counsel, Paul T.
Kunz, and the Objecting Party, Michael Pessetto, appeared in
person, and was represented by his counsel, James E. Morton

and

Randall L. Skeen, and the Court having heard the testimony of
both the Petitioner and the Objecting Party, and the testimony of
the repective witnesses as called by each party, and having heard
the oral arguments of the respective Counsel, and the Court being
fully advised in the premises, enters its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The respective Counsel stipulated

to the Court that the

issues of fact and matters of law to be determined at trial were
as follows:
a.
succession

For
from

the purposes of
William

"Billy

inheritance

Joe" Scheller,

by

intestate

did

Michael

Pessetto establish the parent and child relationship with William
"Billy Joe" Scheller within the meaning of 75-2-109(1)(b)(ii),
U^tah Code Annotated 195 3, as Amended, by openly treating said

IN IHE MATTER Ob THE ESTATE OF
WILLIAM "BILLY JOE"SCHELLER
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named child as his and by not refusing to support said child both
as required by the provisions of said cited statute?
b.
Code

Is 75-2-109(l)(b)( ii) of the Utah Uniform Probate

an unconstitutional

and

sex

discriminating

statute

as

claimed by the Objecting Party, Michael Pessetto?
2.

The Petitioner

and Objecting

Party

through

their

respective counsel thereafter stipulated to the Court to proceed
and present their evidence in regard to issue l.a. above, and
that issue l.b. as to the constitutionality of the cited statute
would

thereafter

be presented

to the Court

through

written

briefs, and by oral arguments, if requested.
3.

Objecting Party, Michael Pessetto, did not refuse to

support the minor child, William "Billy Joe" Scheller, during
his lifetime, Michael Pessetto paid what support he had to pay
and was forced

to pay by Court Order, and he did

absolutely

nothing beyond that.
4.
Michael

Considering all the evidence, the Court finds that
Petssetto

did

not openly

treat William

"Billy

Scheller, deceased, as his child during his lifetime.

Joe"

That the

excuse of Michael Pessetto that he could not find the location of
the mother of the child is a hollow excuse.

The Court further

finds that Michael Pessetto made no meaningful effort to find the
mother and the named child, now deceased.
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5.

Although Michael Pessetto and the mother of the deceased

child were present in Court at the time of the paternity hearing,
on May 23rd and May 24, 1983, that Michael Pessetto made no
effort at that time to ask where he could find the child, how the
child was, or how he could visit the child.
6.

The Court finds that in order for a person to openly

treat a child as his, he would try to find that child; he would
make an effort to pay support; he would make an effort to visit
the child; he would at least send

cards or gifts to a last known

address; and he would inquire as to the condition and wellbeing
of the child at some point.

Michael Pessetto made no meaningful

attempt to do any of those things.
7.

The Court specifically finds that 75-2-109 of the Utah

Uniform Probate Code requires more than an acknowledgement of
paternity following a trial where a person is determined to be
the father of a child.

Michael Pessetto did acknowledge

child as his following a paternity hearing.

the

The cited statute

requires more than acknowledgment. Michael Pessetto did not, in
the opinion of the Court, openly treat the child as his.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based

upon

the foregoing

Findings of Fact, the Court

hereby enters the following Conclusions of Law:
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1.

That

under

the

provisions

Annotated

1953, as Amended, Michael

from

estate

the

Scheller,

of

his

and J o l e e n

deceased

child,

convinces

L. S c h e l l e r

unless

this

deceased

Counsel

Court

that

7JLz 2 z l 9.1

Pessettos
child,

is

for

of

the
the

the

may n o t

William

sole

heir

inherit
Joe"

l a w of

Party

Utah

^ode

"Billy

at

Objecting
cited

HI-a Jh

said

hereafter

statute

is

Pessetto,

is

unconstitutional.
2.

Counsel

for

the Objecting

given

the opportunity

Brief

to

75-2-109
have

the

Court

Utah

twenty

Objecting
Brief.

days

Oral

3.

shall

Court

the

determines

constitute
4.
until

the

For
the

Court

DATED t h i s

issue
^ /

for

days hereof,

unconstitutionality
Petitioner

a Response
thereafter

that

will
cited

of

Brief,
to

Utah

an O r d e r

from

statute

preceding
and

there

entered

the c i t e d

a

of

the

Reply

with

is

its

there.

the

be

of
no

of

MatfJU^Cnk

If

is
the

constitutional,

paragraph

judgment
will

Utah s t a t u t e

the
final

determination

presented.
day

a

shall

and

file

in a c c o r d a n c e

go f o r w a r d

the

purposes,
has

thirty

2.8.

the
Law

ruling

appeal

Constitutional

ten days

the case

of

Michael

a s Amended.

file

is persuaded

that

Conclusions

to

of

may b e r e q u e s t e d

Rule

the Court

unconstitutional,
Court

have

within

claim

1953,

thereafter

arguments

of

If

as to t h e i r

Code A n n o t a t e d

Party

provisions

to p r e s e n t ,

Party,

1987.

DAVID E. ROTH
DISTRICT JUDGE

1.

shall

Court.
judgment
ot

the
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1

Estate of Billy Joe Sche

THE COURT:

.er

I am prepared to make findings of

2 Fact, and then it will be up to the attorneys to convince
3 me whether or not the statute is Constitutional,
4

I have already found that Mr. Pessetto did not refuse

5 to support the child.

I can only find, however, that he

6 paid what he had to pay and was forced to pay by the Court.
7 And he did absolutely nothing beyond that.
The remaining issue of fact is whether he openly treatedi

8

9 the child as his child.

Apparently there is no help in

10 the case law as to what that phrase means, so we look to
11 just the common English language and terms that are used
12 there.

It appears to me that in some way he must have tried

13 to act like a parent to that child at some point.
After having heard all the evidence, I find that he

14

15 has not done that.
16 mother or the child.

His excuse is that he could not find the
I find that to be a hollow excuse.

17 I find that he made no meaningful effort to find the mother
18 and the child.

I don't believe it would have been necessarv

19 to hire a private investigator or an attorney.

Pt

least for

20 part of the time the Schellers were living in Onden, and she
21 had a listed telephone.

That there were contacts made at

22 the time of the paternity.

He made no effort at that

23 time to ask where they were, how the child was, where he
24 could find the child, how he could visit the child.
A person, in my interpretation, vho

25

1

openly treats the

1 child was his would try to find that child, would make an
2 effort to pay support, would make an effort to visit the
3 child, would at least send cards or gifts to a last known
4 address.

Would inquire as to the condition and well beinq

5 of the child at some point.

And I find that Mr. Pessetto

6 made no meaninqful attempt to do any of those thinqs.
7

I find specifically that this statute requires more

8 than an acknowledqement of paternity following a trial where
9 you are determined to be the father.

The evidence would

10 support a finding that he did, followina that, acknowledge
11 that this was his child.

It is curious, though, that he

12 would acknowledge that this was his child v/hile not acknowledging
13 having sexual intercourse with the child*s mother.
14

If the statute required only an acknowledaement, I

15 think that would be the wordina of the statute.
16 say that.

It requires somethinq more than that.

It does not
And I

17 have already found Mr, Pessetto did not in my opinion openly
18 treat the child as his.
19

Based on that finding, it will be the Judament of the

20 Court that he nay not interit from this child unless his
21 attorneys can convince me that this statute is unconsitutiona."
22 If they persuade me that's the case, we v7ill ao from there.
IIR. HORTOII:

23
24 that?

How would the Court like to address

Does the Court want to make a Findina we can take it

25 up as constitutional, or would the Court prefer briefs?

2

1

THE COURT:

Submit your authorities similar to the

2 way you do it under 2.8.
3 respond.
4

Give Mr. Kunz an opportunity to

Regardless of what my decision on that is, I

suspect it is something you will want to take up.

5

You want to have oral argument?

I will leave it up to

6 you to request it if you want.
7

MR. MORTON:

I am not necessarily certain that

8 we would need oral arqument.

May I have a timetable?

May

9 we have 30 days to submit a brief, after which a response
10 period; something like that?
11

THE COURT:

12

MR. KUNZ:

Alright.
Your Honor, do you want the Findinas

13 of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared, except as to the
14 Constitutional question before that date, and signed, or
15 do you want to hold it?
THE COURT:

16

I think that distills it down to one

17 issue remainincr at this level anyway.
18

MR. KUNZ:

Do it that way.

Do it that way and reserve that item

19 as being open?
20

THE COURT:

Right.

21

MR. SKEEN:

However, just to clarify this, there

22 will be no final Judament until the determination is made
23 relative to the Constitutional issue, for appeal purposes?
24

THE COURT:

That f s right.

25

MR. SKEEN:

Thank you.

3

1

MR. MORTON:

Your Honor, with reqard to oral

2 argument, I hate to waive it at this time.

Perhaps I could

3 reserve it.
4

THE COURT:

Follow rule 2.8.

It provides that you

5 can request it if you like.
6

MR. MORTON:

7

THE COURT:

Thank you.
And I can tell you right now if either

8 party requests oral argument, you can have it.
9

MR. MORTON:

10

MR. KUNZ:

11

THE COURT:

12 enouqh to respond?

30 days on my brief?
That's fine with me.
You can have 30 days.

And ten days

That's generally what you have under 2.8.

13 Do you need more than that?
14

MR. KUNZ:

I think in this instance if he is aoina

15 to take 30, maybe I better have 15 anyway, 15 or 20.
16

THE COURT

Twenty, and then ten days for response

17 from you.
18

MR. MORTON:

19

THE COURT:

20
21
22
23
24
25

4

Okay, thank you.
Court is in recess.
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